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INTRODUCTION 
Nevada recently underwent significant changes to its laws on non-compete 
agreements between an employer and an employee. In 2016, the Nevada Su-
preme Court in Golden Road Motor Inn v. Islam affirmed its traditional practice 
of refusing to modify any non-compete agreement that the court found unreason-
able.1 There, the Justices on the Court split in a close four to three decision, with 
the majority deciding in favor of voiding unreasonable non-compete agreements 
at the benefit of the employee, but to the detriment of the employer. However, 
the effects of that decision did not last long. One year after Islam, the Nevada 
legislature enacted Assembly Bill 276 (“AB 276”), which amended Chapter 613 
of Nevada’s Revised Statutes governing non-compete agreements and added that 
“the court shall revise” an unreasonable non-compete agreement so that it is rea-
sonable and enforceable.2 That amendment effectively superseded Islam. It also 
pushed the pendulum for Nevada’s stance on non-compete agreements in an en-
tirely different direction. 
While the Nevada legislature’s actions show a desire to help employers, their 
actions pose more questions than answers. For example, the legislature’s changes 
fail to provide any set guidelines for courts to modify non-compete agreements. 
Their changes also fail to recognize the dissenting Justices’ recommendation in 
Islam to limit the circumstances in which a court could modify a non-compete 
agreement.3 Thus, courts are now charged with navigating a new venture—one 
that goes against the judiciary’s traditional stance—without direction. 
To combat the deficiencies in Nevada’s new law, this Note proposes two 
changes. First, this Note proposes a legislative amendment to AB 276. The 
amendment would limit a court’s ability to reform an overly-broad or otherwise 
unreasonable non-compete agreement to only limited situations where the em-
ployer provides the following evidence: that it did not intentionally overreach in 
                                                        
1  Golden Rd. Motor Inn, Inc. v. Islam, 376 P.3d 151, 156 (Nev. 2016). 
2  Assemb. B. 276, 2017 Leg., 79th Sess. (Nev. 2017). When this assembly bill goes into effect, 
it will replace the language of Nevada’s prior law regarding non-compete agreements: NRS 
613. See id. (“Chapter 613 of NRS is hereby amended by adding thereto a new section to read 
as follows. . . .”). 
3  See Islam, 376 P.3d at 162 (Hardesty, J., dissenting) (explaining that the court should only 
elect to pick up the blue-pencil when equities run in favor of modification). 
18 NEV. L.J. 261, KALKOWSKI- FINAL 12/15/17  4:56 PM 
Fall 2017] RECOGNIZING AN OVERCORRECTION 263 
drafting the terms to the non-compete agreement; and, that it did not use its 
greater bargaining power to force the employee into accepting the restrictive 
terms of the non-compete agreement. Second, this Note proposes a process that 
courts can use to interpret that amendment: a burden-shifting analysis where the 
employer bears the initial burden of showing that it attempted to draft a fair, 
reasonable non-compete agreement. 
Although these proposals place a large limitation on Nevada’s newly enacted 
law, they are necessary to limit an employer’s overreach in drafting a non-com-
pete agreement that burdens modern society’s mobile workforce and globally 
competitive industries.4 This policy also serves the long-held legal principle of 
honoring two parties’ freedom to contract when the equities run in favor of such 
action.5 
  To explain the need for Nevada to amend its recent legislative action, this 
Note will first provide a historical background to non-compete agreements to 
show the gradual growth and acceptance of such agreements. Next, the Note will 
explore the different methods that states use to modify unreasonable non-com-
pete agreements. It will then explain the Supreme Court of Nevada’s decision in 
Islam, followed by the legislature’s superseding amendment, AB 276. Last, this 
Note will outline a practical procedure that Nevada should adopt to modify un-
reasonable non-compete agreements—one that requires an amendment to Ne-
vada’s newly passed legislation as well as a burden-shifting analysis for the 
courts. 
I. THE NON-COMPETE AGREEMENT  
The non-compete agreement is a contractual obligation where an individual 
agrees that he or she will not compete in a certain market after an employment 
relationship ends.6 The purpose of the non-compete agreement is to protect the 
employer rather than harm the employee.7 That is, when the employer gives cer-
                                                        
4  See Chiara F. Orsini, Protecting an Employer’s Human Capital: Covenants Not to Compete 
and the Changing Business Environment, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 175, 179 (2000) (discussing the 
“issues in drafting and enforcing these covenants, particularly with respect to the time and 
geographic restraints” because of the increased reach of online companies and the technolog-
ical expansion in employment industries). 
5  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“[N]o State shall . . . pass any . . . law impairing the Obligation 
of Contracts.”); James W. Ely, Jr., The Protection of Contractual Rights: A Tale of Two Con-
stitutional Provisions, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 370, 383 (2005) (“Like jurisprudence under 
the Contract Clause to safeguard existing agreements, the notion of contractual freedom had 
deep roots in the legal culture.”). 
6  Gerald T. Laurie & David A. Harbeck, Balancing Business Protection with Freedom to 
Work: A Review of Noncompete Agreements in Minnesota, 23 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 107, 
108 (1997). 
7  Norman D. Bishara & Evan Starr, The Incomplete Noncompete Picture, 20 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 497, 506 (2016); see Griffin Toronjo Pivateau, Putting the Blue Pencil Down: An 
Argument for Specificity in Noncompete Agreements, 86 NEB. L. REV. 672, 676 (2008). 
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tain benefits to the employee, such as specialized knowledge of the field, an op-
portunity to earn the good will of customers, and specialized skills, the non-com-
pete agreement then ensures that the employee will not use those benefits to as-
sist any future employers that compete with the previous employer.8 Thus, the 
employer often exerts a restriction on the employee’s future employment in terms 
of geographical scope, time, and post-employment activity.9 
A. History of the Non-Compete Agreement 
The practice of restricting an individual following the end of an employment 
relationship originated in fifteenth century England.10 The first case to specifi-
cally address the issue of non-compete agreements was Dyer’s Case.11 There, an 
employer agreed to train an individual to dye fabric, and that individual in turn 
agreed that he would not compete against his employer’s trade in his employer’s 
town for a period of six months after he completed his apprenticeship.12 The em-
ployer later charged the employee with violating this initial agreement, and 
brought an action to enforce the terms of the non-compete agreement.13 The 
judge presiding over the case disagreed, however, and refused to honor the agree-
ment at all.14 In fact, the presiding judge expressed such outrage to the restraint 
on the trainee that if the master had been present in court, the judge would have 
imprisoned him until he paid a fine to the king.15 This strong stance laid the 
groundwork for later courts to view non-compete agreements as per se invalid.16 
This per se invalidity gained more strength roughly 200 years later in Col-
gate v. Bacheler, where a court held that even though a restriction was limited in 
its duration and geographic scope and could be removed by a monetary payment, 
it was nonetheless invalid as a matter of law.17 The court stated that such re-
strictions were “against the benefit of the commonwealth,” and regardless of the 
scope of the restriction, the defendant “ought not to be abridged of his trade and 
living.”18 
The courts’ rigid stance toward non-compete agreements eventually weak-
ened, however. The agreements gained legal recognition in the seminal case of 
                                                        
8  Reddy v. Cmty. Health Found. of Man, 298 S.E.2d 906, 912 (W. Va. 1982). 
9  See Pivateau, supra note 7. 
10  Cathy Packer & Johanna Cleary, Rediscovering the Public Interest: An Analysis of the 
Common Law Governing Post-Employment Non-Compete Contracts for Media Employees, 24 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1073, 1078 (2007). 
11  See Dyer’s Case, YB 2 Hen. 5, fol. 5, pl. 26 (1414) (Eng.). 
12  Id. 
13  Id. 
14  Id. 
15  Id.; see Packer & Cleary, supra note 10. 
16  See Maureen B. Callahan, Comment, Post-Employment Restraint Agreements: A Reassess-
ment, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 707 (1985). 
17  Colgate v. Bacheler, (1602) 78 Eng. Rep. 1097 (K.B.), 1079; see Callahan, supra note 16, 
at 708. 
18  Colgate, 78 Eng. Rep. at 1097. 
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Mitchel v. Reynolds in 1711.19 In Mitchel, the court balanced the social utility of 
certain types of economic restraints against the undesirable effects on both par-
ties to the agreement.20 The Mitchel court’s decision stood for the standard that 
“a man may, upon a valuable consideration, by his own consent, and for his own 
profit, give over his trade; and part with it to another in a particular place.”21 
The principal reasons for a non-compete agreement discussed in Mitchel still 
remain the standard used by courts today: (1) employers have a legitimate inter-
est in retaining their customer bases; and, (2) an employer has a legitimate inter-
est in protecting trade secrets and confidential information.22 But the Mitchel 
court did not entirely reject past courts’ focus on the disadvantages of non-com-
pete agreements. Instead, the court simply opened the door to such agreements 
yet retained a skeptical eye toward them, as shown by the court’s language that 
the agreements are subject to “great abuses . . . from masters, who are apt to give 
their apprentices much vexation on this account, and to use many indirect prac-
tices to procure such bonds from them, lest they should prejudice them in their 
custom, when they come to set up for themselves.”23 This balance between hon-
oring the social utility of non-compete agreements and recognizing the potential 
social harm effectively paved the way for the modern-day recognition of non-
compete agreements in the United States.  
B. The Modern Non-Compete Agreement 
The progressive outlook of Mitchel in non-compete agreements still stands 
in our modern-day employment sector. Non-compete agreements are often 
formed in two instances: when hiring a new employee, or when purchasing an 
established business.24 There are many growing issues in this area of law, how-
ever. For instance, employers are utilizing non-compete agreements more often 
due to the increased mobility of the average worker.25 Indeed, the past employ-
ment structure of limited positions of entry, hierarchical job ladders, and long-
                                                        
19  Mitchel v. Reynolds, (1711) 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B.), 347. 
20  Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 630 (1960). 
21  Mitchel, 24 Eng. Rep. at 349. In regard to the employer’s protection of trade secrets and 
confidential information, employers often use non-disclosure agreements, which bar an em-
ployee from sharing trade secrets. See Matt Marx et al., Regional Disadvantage? Employee 
Non-Compete Agreements and Brain Drain, 44 RES. POL’Y 394 (2015). But non-compete 
agreements also assist an employer to protect that information by simply eliminating an ex-
employee’s opportunity to disclose that information in the first place. See id. 
22  T. Leigh Anenson, The Role of Equity in Employment Noncompetition Cases, 42 AM. BUS. 
L.J. 1, 13–14 (2005). 
23  Mitchel, 24 Eng. Rep. at 350; see Blake, supra note 20, at 626. 
24  See Pivateau, supra note 7, at 675. 
25  Jeanne Meister, The Future of Work: Job Hopping Is the ‘New Normal’ for Millennials, 
FORBES, (Aug. 14, 2012, 8:58 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeannemeister/2012/08/14/ 
job-hopping-is-the-new-normal-for-millennials-three-ways-to-prevent-a-human-resource-
nightmare/#50b11d765508 [https://perma.cc/Q396-AJB7] (stating the average worker stays 
with one employer for only four-and-a-half years before moving to another). 
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term employment is quickly changing into short-term employment, lateral mo-
bility, general training, and skill development.26 That leaves employers at a con-
tinued disadvantage in trying to both heavily invest in specialized training and 
retain any advantage in an increasingly volatile and competitive industry.27 As a 
result, states have articulated their own standards for how to deal with non-com-
pete agreements while balancing those restraints against the need for a free mar-
ket.28 
II. THE DIFFERING APPROACHES THAT STATES TAKE TO NON-COMPETE 
AGREEMENTS 
There are two general ways that states deal with non-compete agreements: 
(1) statutory regulation; and (2) common law. Currently, only three states gener-
ally prohibit the agreements (California, North Dakota, Oklahoma).29 Con-
versely, twenty-six states now have state statutes that permit non-compete agree-
ments.30 Those states commonly enforce durational limitations, 
occupation/industry-specific exemptions, wage thresholds, enforcement doc-
trines, and prior notice requirements.31 Likewise, states that utilize common law 
rather than statutory framework generally mirror the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, which provides that: 
1. A promise to refrain from competition that imposes a restraint that is ancil-
lary to an otherwise valid transaction or relationship is unreasonably in re-
straint of trade if (a) the restraint is greater than is needed to protect the 
promisee’s legitimate interest, or (b) the promisee’s need is outweighed by 
the hardship to the promisor and the likely injury to the public. 
2. Promises imposing restraints that are ancillary to a valid transaction or rela-
tionship include the following: (a) a promise by the seller of a business not 
to compete with the buyer in such a way as to injure the value of the business 
sold; (b) a promise by an employee or other agent not to compete with his 
employer or other principal; (c) a promise by a partner not to compete with 
the partnership.32 
                                                        
26  Anenson, supra note 22, at 15. 
27  See John Dwight Ingram, Covenants Not to Compete, 36 AKRON L. REV. 49, 60 (2002) 
(“The employee would go to the competitor with full knowledge of the former employer’s 
‘products, its development strategies, its marketing plans, its customers and other significant 
business information which can[not] be set aside. . . . what he knows about [the former em-
ployer] is bound to influence what he does for [the competitor],’ and that will disadvantage 
the former employer.”). 
28  Pivateau, supra note 7, at 677. 
29  Id. This assertion is based on those state’s general tendencies; it does not claim that the 
states honor that position in all disputes. 
30  Non-Compete Reform: A Policymaker’s Guide to State Policies, WHITE HOUSE 1 (2016) 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/competition/state-by-statenoncom-
petesexplainer_unembargoedfinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/BN3N-73ZT]. 
31  Id. at 2. 
32  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 (AM. LAW. INST. 1981) (emphasis added). 
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Not all courts enjoy the ease of a black-letter definition for non-compete 
agreements, however, because the general outlines of a “reasonable” agreement 
are constantly changing. That is, our current markets are increasingly globalized, 
and technology is rapidly changing.33 This constant instability drastically extends 
or rescinds a court’s previous definition of what terms are reasonable in any spe-
cific market.34 Further, this instability is not just limited to high-tech companies; 
rather, the growing expansiveness of companies now heads inescapable interstate 
competition at nearly all levels of the market.35 So courts that deal with either 
statutory or common law regulation of non-compete agreements are faced with 
a growing dilemma: how to deal with increasingly mobile employees on both an 
international and national level while also ensuring a consistent baseline for rea-
sonable non-compete agreements. That question is largely dictated by whichever 
state’s law the court must apply. 
A. Jurisdictional Approaches to Non-Compete Agreements 
Whichever court holds jurisdiction over an employer’s attempt to enforce a 
non-compete agreement largely dictates exactly when and in what circumstances 
the non-compete agreement will be honored or eliminated. Courts ultimately 
hold the power to modify or eliminate a non-compete agreement through the 
“blue-pencil doctrine,”36 which arises from the equitable powers possessed by 
the judiciary—a system of relief built on flexibility and fairness based on the 
specific facts of any case.37 This doctrine allows a court to either (1) strike un-
reasonable clauses from a non-compete agreement, or (2) modify the agreement 
to reflect the terms that the parties could have—and should have—agreed to.38 
                                                        
33  Ann C. Hodges & Porcher L. Taylor, III, The Business Fallout from the Rapid Obsolescence 
and Planned Obsolescence of High-Tech Products: Downsizing of Noncompetition Agree-
ments, 6 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 3, 9, 24, & 25 (2005); see Orsini, supra note 4, at 179 
(“With the rapid advancement in Internet-related technologies, not only is knowledge becom-
ing out-of-date in increasingly shorter periods of time, but high technology products are also 
becoming obsolete in shorter periods of time. This changes the dynamics of the customer base 
and of the employer interest that is being protected by these covenants.”). 
34  See Orsini, supra note 4, at 180 (discussing decisions by the Eleventh Circuit and the Geor-
gia Supreme Court that reflect courts adaptations to the ever-changing scope of non-compete 
agreements). 
35  See generally id. 
36  Pivateau, supra note 7, at 673. 
37  See Timenterial, Inc. v. Dagata, 277 A.2d 512, 514 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1971) (discussing the 
courts’ equitable powers); see also Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944) (“The 
essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do equity and to mould 
each decree to the necessities of the particular case. Flexibility rather than rigidity has distin-
guished it.”); Samuel L. Bray, The System of Equitable Remedies, 63 UCLA L. REV. 530, 541 
(2016); John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122 YALE 
L.J. 522, 539 (2012). 
38  See Robert J. Orelup & Christopher S. Drewry, Judicial Review and Reformation of Non-
compete Agreements, CONSTRUCTION LAW., Summer 2009, at 29, 30–31. But courts also gen-
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B. The Blue-Pencil Doctrine 
In looking to the two methods of blue-penciling stated above, the first 
method allows courts to simply remove unreasonable terms from the agreement 
and leave the remaining terms to be applied.39 This method’s advantage is that it 
retains the non-compete agreement’s original wording, which presumptively 
keeps the original intent of the agreement largely intact.40 But it also runs the 
strong risk of rendering a non-compete agreement incomprehensible.41 For ex-
ample, if the court were to strike an unreasonable portion in a paragraph, that 
alteration could essentially change the meaning of the entire paragraph by taking 
away a defining term used later in the agreement or by lessening the strength of 
the intended language.42 This means that the method of striking terms can only 
be used when an agreement is “divisible”;43 that is, the court can only strike un-
reasonable terms when it can clearly separate the reasonable parts of the agree-
ment from the unreasonable.44 
The second approach to blue-penciling an agreement allows the court to re-
place an agreement’s unreasonable terms with reasonable ones.45 For example, a 
court may rewrite a five-year non-compete agreement into a one-year re-
striction.46 One of the benefits of this approach is that employers retain the agree-
ment in some form while only altering the original extent of the restrictions. 
However, this method runs the risk of destroying the parties’ original intent by 
eliminating the specific restrictions that the parties believed were most im-
portant.47 For instance, an employer may have drafted a non-compete agreement 
with the focus of restricting the employee in terms of time because that was most 
important to a unique, temporary business practice. But if the court were to re-
write the agreement and make that time restriction reasonable, the modified 
                                                        
eralize the term blue-penciling to refer to both striking and modifying agreements. For con-
sistency, this Note will use the term “blue-penciling” as a reference to both striking and/or 
modifying a non-compete agreement. 
39  Kenneth R. Swift, Void Agreements, Knocked-Out Terms, and Blue Pencils: Judicial and 
Legislative Handling of Unreasonable Terms in Noncompete Agreements, 24 HOFSTRA LAB. 
& EMP. L.J. 223, 247 (2007). 
40  See Deutsche Post Glob. Mail, Ltd. v. Conrad, 292 F. Supp. 2d 748, 754 (D. Md. 2003) 
(explaining that the practice of striking the terms to an over-broad agreement “would not in-
volve any rewriting or reorganizing of the remaining language.”). 
41  See A.N. Deringer, Inc. v. Strough, 103 F.3d 243, 247 (2d Cir. 1996) (observing that the 
form of striking provisions is only practicable “to the extent that a grammatically meaningful 
reasonable restriction remains after the words making the restriction unreasonable are 
stricken.”). 
42  See Clark’s Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Smith, 4 N.E.3d 772, 785 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (stating 
that removing certain portions of a non-compete agreement would change “the entire meaning 
and import of each paragraph.”). 
43  Id. 
44  Id. 
45  Swift, supra note 39, at 245. 
46  See Davies & Davies Agency, Inc. v. Davies, 298 N.W.2d 127, 131 (Minn. 1980). 
47  See generally id. 
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agreement could then lessen the temporal restriction to a period not long enough 
to actually allow the business to benefit from its unique practice.48 So, courts that 
adopt this method must balance honoring the purpose of the agreement and ef-
fectively restricting an employee. 
III. NEVADA’S APPROACH TO THE NON-COMPETE AGREEMENT 
The advantages of blue-penciling discussed above illustrate how courts can 
effectively hold an employee accountable to a contract while also keeping an 
employer from overreaching. Nonetheless, Nevada historically stood strong as a 
state that voided a non-compete agreement when the court deemed any portion 
of the agreement unreasonable.49 Stated differently, Nevada neither struck nor 
modified unreasonable terms in an unreasonable non-compete agreement, opting 
instead to eliminate an unreasonable agreement altogether. This changed, how-
ever, in the 2017 Nevada legislative session. But before discussing that change, 
it is important to first examine the reasoning behind the Nevada judiciary’s orig-
inal refusal to modify unreasonable non-compete agreements. 
The Nevada judiciary outlined the rationale for its traditional practice of re-
fusing to modify unreasonable non-compete agreements in two cases: Ellis v. 
McDaniel50 and Jones v. Deeter.51 In Ellis v. McDaniel, the appellant, Dr. Charles 
T. Ellis, was an orthopedic surgeon employed with Collett, Hood, Moren and 
Read, Ltd. (“Elko Clinic”), beginning in September of 1978.52 Both parties en-
tered into a non-compete agreement, which stated that when Ellis’s employment 
at the Elko Clinic ended, he would not compete with the Elko Clinic for a period 
of two years within a radius of five miles from the city of Elko.53 If Ellis were to 
violate the agreement, the Elko Clinic reserved the right to obtain a permanent 
injunction from the Fourth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada.54 
About a year after Ellis started working for the Elko Clinic, he expressed his 
intent to form his own orthopedic surgery office in Elko.55 The Elko Clinic then 
filed a complaint with the Fourth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada.56 
The Elko Clinic also moved for a preliminary injunction against Ellis, alleging 
that Ellis violated his covenant not to compete by taking steps to enter into a 
                                                        
48  See Swift, supra note 39, at 233. 
49  See Jones v. Deeter, 913 P.2d 1272, 1275 (Nev. 1996) (stating an unreasonable non-compete 
agreement is per se unreasonable and therefore, unenforceable). 
50  Ellis v. McDaniel, 596 P.2d 222, 225 (Nev. 1979) (discussing the modification of an in-
junction placed on a terminated employee). 
51  Deeter, 913 P.2d at 1272 (discussing the refusal to modify a non-compete agreement be-
tween a past employee and employer). 
52  Ellis, 596 P.2d at 223. 
53  Id. 
54  Id. 
55  Id. 
56  Id. 
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private practice in competition with the Elko Clinic.57 The district court granted 
the request, and entered an injunction against Ellis that mirrored the geographic 
and durational terms stated in the original non-compete agreement between Ellis 
and the Elko Clinic.58 Ellis then appealed the district court decision to the Su-
preme Court of Nevada.59 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada evaluated the district court’s pre-
liminary injunction to determine whether the terms of the agreement were rea-
sonable. The court stated: 
[T]he test . . . for determining the validity of the covenant as written is whether it 
imposes upon the employee (a) greater restraint than is reasonably necessary to 
protect the business and goodwill of the employer. A restraint of trade is unrea-
sonable, in the absence of statutory authorization or dominant social or economic 
justification, if it is greater than is required for the protection of the person for 
whose benefit the restraint is imposed or imposes undue hardship upon the person 
restricted.60 
The Supreme Court of Nevada ultimately concluded that the terms of the 
agreement were reasonable.61 The court found that the agreement could not be 
enforced, however, because the agreement did not protect a legitimate interest of 
the Elko Clinic since the Elko Clinic did not offer services dealing with orthope-
dic surgery—Ellis’s specialty practice.62 Ellis and the Elko Clinic were thus not 
competitors in the same market, and the agreement was beyond the scope of any 
legitimate protectable interest of the Elko Clinic.63 But rather than strike the pre-
liminary injunction as unenforceable, the Nevada Supreme Court elected to mod-
ify it.64 The court enforced the geographical and territorial restraints, but re-
moved the portion that prohibited Ellis from practicing his specialty of 
orthopedic surgery.65 In doing so, the Supreme Court of Nevada expressed a will-
ingness to change non-compete agreements during the course of a trial through 
a preliminary injunction. However, the decision did not speak to whether Nevada 
would extend the practice of modifying agreements to permanent injunctions.66 
                                                        
57  Id. 
58  Id. 
59  Id. 
60  Id. at 224 (citing Hansen v. Edwards, 426 P.2d 792 (Nev. 1967)). 
61  Id. 
62  Id. at 224–25. 
63  Id. at 224. 
64  Id. at 225. 
65  Id.; see also Hansen, 426 P.2d at 794 (modifying a preliminary injunction that initially 
prevented an individual from competing with a past employer within a 100-mile radius and 
without any durational limit to the limits of the city of Reno and a time interval of one year). 
66  Permanent injunctions begin at the end of a trial and extend indefinitely or until a court 
defines an end date. Shane K. Blank, Preliminary Versus Permanent Injunctions: A Focused 
Look at the Distinctions Between Them, 72 J. MO. B. 254, 256 (2016) (“A permanent injunc-
tion, on the other hand, is designed to indefinitely enjoin unlawful conduct that would other-
wise cause irreparable harm. Said differently, a preliminary injunction is best viewed as a 
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After its decision in Ellis, the Supreme Court of Nevada in Jones v. Deeter67 
refused to modify a non-compete agreement between an employer and employee. 
In Jones, Larry Jones was an assistant at Deeter Lighting (a supplier of lighting 
equipment).68 At the beginning of Jones and Deeter’s employment relationship, 
Deeter drafted an employment agreement, which contained a non-compete 
agreement that prohibited Jones from working with a competitor in the lighting 
and retrofitting business for five years and within a 100-mile radius of the 
Reno/Sparks area after the employment relationship ended.69 
Three months after Jones started his position, Deeter terminated Jones.70 
Without wasting any time to find new employment, Jones reached out to a com-
petitor in the lighting and retrofitting business the next day to establish an em-
ployment relationship.71 
When Deeter learned of this employment relationship, it filed a complaint 
against Jones to enforce the non-compete agreement.72 Ultimately, the District 
Court of Nevada enforced the non-compete agreement in its full terms, among 
other damage awards.73 
Jones then appealed the district court’s enforcement of the non-compete 
agreement, arguing that the agreement was unenforceable as a matter of law.74 
Although the Supreme Court of Nevada rejected that argument, it nonetheless 
found that the non-compete agreement was unenforceable because the agree-
ment’s five-year duration imposed an unreasonable and unnecessary restriction 
against Jones.75 But rather than modify the agreement as the court did in Ellis 
with a preliminary injunction, the Supreme Court of Nevada did not take any 
further action.76 Instead, the court declared the agreement void as unreasonable, 
and, therefore, unenforceable.77 
Together, Ellis and Jones demonstrated Nevada’s divergence in modifying 
restraints in the employment context. The cases showed that Nevada courts were 
unwilling to invade contractual relations between two parties when that invasion 
would result in a permanent restraint; yet the Nevada Supreme Court was per-
                                                        
function of preservation, whereas permanent injunctions are functions of long-term protec-
tion.”). 
67  Jones v. Deeter, 913 P.2d 1272, 1272 (Nev. 1996). 
68  Id. at 1273. 
69  Id. 
70  Id. 
71  Id. 
72  Id. Notably, Deeter’s complaint sought enforcement of the non-compete agreement rather 
than allowing the district court to create its own preliminary injunction as was done in Ellis. 
See Ellis v. McDaniel, 596 P.2d 222, 223 (Nev. 1979). 
73  Deeter, 913 P.2d at 1274. 
74  Id. 
75  Id. 
76  Id. at 1276. 
77  Id. at 1275. 
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fectly content with modifying a court-imposed temporary preliminary injunc-
tion.78 Essentially, this shows that Nevada employed the modification of a non-
compete agreement to simply buy time for the court to further evaluate the agree-
ment. That way, Nevada courts could err on the side of caution to prevent any 
further irreparable harm to the defendant during litigation—a central purpose of 
a preliminary injunction.79 
In line with its decisions in Ellis and Jones, the Nevada Supreme Court re-
cently affirmed its long-held tradition of voiding unreasonable non-compete 
agreements in the 2016 decision of Golden Road Motor Inn v. Islam. In that case, 
the Nevada Supreme Court Justices narrowly rejected any attempt to modify an 
unreasonable non-compete agreement in a four to three decision.80 But that nar-
row decision highlighted the fact that Nevada’s strict practice of voiding unrea-
sonable non-compete agreements was at a tipping point. Moreover, the recent 
retirement of Justice Nancy Saitta—one of the majority justices in the court’s 
Islam opinion—revitalized the issue of whether Nevada’s all-or-nothing ap-
proach to non-compete agreements should change.81 Even further, the Islam de-
cision brought the issue to the forefront of the legislative agenda.82 
With these recent events in mind, the remaining discussion will evaluate the 
Islam decision and Nevada’s recent statutory amendment on the issue. It will 
then explore a different path that the court should take in future cases: a path that 
aligns with the dissent in Islam, and one that elects to modify non-compete agree-
ments in limited circumstances. 
A. The Nevada Supreme Court Continues Its Tradition of Voiding Over-Broad 
Non-Compete Agreements in the Decision of Golden Road Motor Inn v. 
Islam 
In Islam, Sumona Islam was a casino host at the Atlantis Casino in Reno, 
Nevada.83 As a part of Islam’s employment with the Atlantis Casino, she signed 
several documents—one of those documents being a covenant not to compete.84 
The covenant restricted Islam from employment at, association with, or service 
                                                        
78  See Golden Rd. Motor Inn, Inc. v. Islam, 376 P.3d 151, 156 (2016). 
79  See ELAINE W. SHOBEN ET AL., REMEDIES, CASES AND PROBLEMS 65 (6th ed. 2016) (citing 
Zeringue v. St. James Parish Sch. Bd., 130 So.3d 356 (La. Ct. App. 2013)). 
80  Islam, 376 P.3d at 156. 
81  Jeff German, Nevada Supreme Court Justice Nancy Saitta is Stepping Down, L.V. REV. J. 
(June 27, 2016, 3:59 PM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/politics/government/nevada-su-
preme-court-justice-nancy-saitta-stepping-down [https://perma.cc/VU9F-Q8L7]. 
82  Patrick Hicks & Timothy Roehrs, Tectonic Shift Affecting Enforcement of Noncompetition 
Agreements Emanates from the 2017 Nevada Legislative Session and Passage of AB 276, 
LITTLER PUBLICATIONS (June 22, 2017), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/tectonic-shift-af-
fecting-enforcement-of-39639/ [https://perma.cc/JD7A-2ZVV] (“That case sent shockwaves 
affecting noncompetition agreements employers already had in place. . . .”). 
83  Islam, 376 P.3d at 153. 
84  Id. 
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in any other gaming establishment within 150 miles of the Atlantis Casino for 
one year following the end of her employment.85 
Following three years at the Atlantis Casino, Islam resigned after she became 
dissatisfied with her work.86 Islam did not leave quietly. Rather, she altered and 
concealed the contact information to eighty-seven players in the Atlantis elec-
tronic database—information that she gathered and learned solely because of her 
employment at the Atlantis Casino.87 She also hand-wrote casino player’s names, 
contact information, level of play, game preferences, credit limits, and other pro-
prietary information from the database in a personal notebook.88 
Following Islam’s resignation from Atlantis, she received a position as a ca-
sino host at the Grand Sierra Resort (“GSR”) in Reno, Nevada.89 Once employed 
at the GSR, Islam placed the information that she copied from the Atlantis into 
the GSR database.90 Believing that information was from Islam’s prior employ-
ment relationships, GSR marketed their hotel to the Atlantis players.91 Atlantis 
learned of this, and filed a complaint against both Islam and the GSR.92 
After a bench trial, the district court found Islam liable for breach of contract 
and violation of Nevada Uniform Trade Secrets Act.93 The court imposed a per-
manent injunction on Islam to cease further use of any Atlantis trade secrets, and 
awarded Atlantis both compensatory and punitive damages.94 The court held, 
however, that it would not enforce the non-compete agreement in Islam’s em-
ployment contract with Atlantis because it found the non-compete agreement un-
reasonable.95 Thereafter, all parties appealed the decision; among other issues on 
appeal, Atlantis challenged the court’s refusal to honor the non-compete agree-
ment.96 
1. A Majority of Justices Find the Agreement Unreasonable and Refuse 
to Modify or Alter the Terms of the Agreement. 
In its decision, the Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court’s 
finding that Atlantis’s non-compete agreement was unreasonable.97 The court 
                                                        
85  Id. 
86  Id. at 154. 
87  Id. A “player” is a casino patron that is a member of the casino’s players-club. Casinos 
regularly keep a client-list of wealthy, consistent players at the casino. See Types of Casino 
Players, BEST NETENT CASINO, http://bestnetentcasino.info/en/mind/types-of-players-at-the-
casino [https://perma.cc/F3T4-BUG5] (last updated Feb. 27, 2017). 
88  Islam, 376 P.3d at 154. 
89  Id. 
90  Id. 
91  Id. 
92  Id. 
93  Id.; NEV. REV. STAT. § 600A.030(2) (1987). 
94  Islam, 376 P.3d at 154. 
95  Id. 
96  Id. 
97  Id. at 155–56. 
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stated that although there is no “inflexible formula for deciding the ubiquitous 
question of reasonableness,” the court will rely on case law to determine when a 
non-compete agreement “extends beyond what is necessary to protect [a com-
pany’s] interest.”98 In doing so, the court found Atlantis’s non-compete agree-
ment unreasonable for two reasons: first, the agreement’s terms prohibiting Islam 
from employment, affiliation, or service with any gaming business or enterprise 
extended beyond what was necessary to protect Atlantis’s interest, and, second, 
it presented an undue hardship on Islam because it limited Islam’s ability to be 
gainfully employed.99 
Alongside the Nevada Supreme Court’s finding that Atlantis’s non-compete 
agreement was unreasonable, the court also refused to adopt any new practice of 
modifying or striking terms from an unreasonable agreement.100 The court stated, 
“Rightfully, we have long refrained from reforming or blue-penciling” private 
parties’ contracts.101 In supporting its refusal to adopt a blue-penciling practice 
based on public policy reasons, the court looked to the argument made by the 
Georgia Supreme Court in Richard P. Rita Pers. Servs. Int’l, Inc. v. Kot as a 
starting point.102 In Richard, the Georgia court cringed at the potential negative 
result of a court’s modification of a non-compete agreement and warned that “if 
severance is generally applied, employers can fashion truly ominous covenants 
with confidence that they will be pared down and enforced when the facts of a 
particular case are not unreasonable. . . .”103 The Nevada Supreme Court also 
provided three reasons for its long-held practice: (1) modifying a contract holds 
a strong possibility of “trampling the parties’ contractual intent”; (2) preservation 
of judicial resources; and (3) protecting the employee from the employer’s far 
superior bargaining position.104 
In the court’s first reason, it prevented any chance that a future decision may 
take liberty with even a small modification. Instead, the court established a firm 
ground to limit the judiciary’s ability to draft their own terms in any agreement. 
The court supported that decision by stating, “Drafting would simply be inappro-
priate public policy as it conflicts with the impartiality that is required of the 
bench.”105 In the court’s discussion of the second reason, the court emphasized 
judicial restraint; and the court aligned with the position that any sense of doubt 
or ambiguity in a contract should be construed against the drafter.106 This practice 
ensures that a court does not waste valuable time and resources re-drafting a con-
tract when an employer could have drafted a proper agreement in the first place. 
                                                        
98  Id. at 155. 
99  Id. 
100  Id. at 156. 
101  Id. (citing Reno Club, Inc. v. Young Inv. Co., 182 P.2d 1011, 1016 (Nev. 1947)). 
102  Id. at 157. 
103  Id. (citing Richard P. Rita Pers. Servs. Int’l, Inc. v. Kot, 191 S.E.2d 79, 81 (Ga. 1972)). 
104  Id. at 157–58. 
105  Id. at 157. 
106  Id. at 158. 
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The court’s third reason was the principal policy behind the decision in Is-
lam. The court emphasized that a strict test of reasonableness must be applied to 
restrictive covenants in employment cases based on the nature of the employee-
employer relationship.107 In other words, “one who has nothing but his labor to 
sell, and is in urgent need of selling that, cannot well afford to raise any objection 
to any terms of the contract of employment offered to him, so long as the wages 
are acceptable.”108 And when faced with an employer bringing a lawsuit, many 
employees simply acquiesce with unreasonable non-compete agreement terms 
rather than risk the expense of litigation.109 The court further stated that in the 
context of an agreement for a restraint of trade, “a good-faith presumption bene-
fitting the employer is unwarranted.”110 Additionally, the court argued that a 
strict rule of refusing to modify any unreasonable agreement encourages employ-
ers to not “free-ride” on the knowledge that a court will correct their wrongs in 
the future.111 
2. The Dissenting Justices Agree That the Agreement Is Unreasonable, 
but Argue That the Court Should Elect to Modify the Agreement to 
Make It Enforceable. 
The three policy reasons discussed by the majority did not entirely resonate 
with the dissenting Justices in Islam. Rather, the dissenting Justices argued that 
the court should have recognized that its refusal to modify non-compete agree-
ments did not need to be a black-and-white, all-or-nothing rule. Instead, the dis-
sent argued for a narrow exception: 
[A]bsent some showing of bad faith on Atlantis’ part, of which there was none, I 
would follow the approach taken by this court and a majority of other courts and 
preserve the non-compete agreement by modifying or severing the overly broad 
provision and thereby maintain the restriction on Islam’s future employment in a 
competing casino host position.112 
And this exception came in sharp contrast to the majority’s public policy ration-
ales. 
To the majority’s first argument, the dissent responded that the intent of the 
parties would be central to a court’s modification of the agreement.113 Moreover, 
a court could look to evidence surrounding the actual agreement, and then apply 
some objective criteria to modify any terms.114 In this specific case, the dissent 
argued it could easily look to the parties’ contract as a whole to decipher their 
intent—for example, by looking to the ethics and code of conduct agreement, 
                                                        
107  Id. 
108  Id. (quoting Menter Co. v. Brock, 180 N.W. 553, 555 (Minn. 1920)). 
109  Swift, supra note 39, at 255. 
110  Islam, 376 P.3d at 158. 
111  Id. 
112  Id. at 162–63 (Hardesty, J., dissenting in part). 
113  Id. at 163. 
114  Id. at 165. 
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which discusses the disclosure of confidential information, including the exact 
issue in dispute: customer lists.115 The dissent argued that “[a]pplying the whole-
sale invalidation rule completely ignores, rather than violates, the parties’ intent 
in this case.”116 
Turning to the majority’s second point, the dissent argued that modifying an 
agreement does not actually waste judicial resources.117 The court explained that 
not only would modification be the next logical step in determining whether an 
agreement is unreasonable, but a court could always exercise its discretion to 
refuse to modify an agreement if it found any evidence of bad faith, intentional 
overreach by the employer, or exertion of the employer’s bargaining power over 
the employee.118 That way, potential litigation would limit employers by requir-
ing evidence of good-faith efforts in negotiating non-compete agreements. Ad-
ditionally, an entire contract would not be thrown away after the fact-intensive 
and highly unpredictable process of determining reasonability—thus, maximiz-
ing the use of already stretched judicial resources.119 
The dissent also emphasized the importance of non-compete agreements to 
Nevada businesses that rely heavily on protecting confidential information, such 
as the client lists at issue in Islam.120 The dissent argued that, by adopting such a 
strict measure, the majority effectively puts the employer at an extreme disad-
vantage.121 Modification, to combat that disadvantage, would encourage a more 
even-handed approach while still favoring the employee by continuing to firmly 
limit restrictions in the end. 
Altogether, the arguments by the majority and the dissent highlighted the 
single driving force behind the blue-penciling debate: public policy. But the piv-
otal question is whether that public policy is truly best served by a strict all-or-
nothing approach to unreasonable non-compete agreements. 
B. The Nevada Legislature Changes Course 
The court’s freedom to refuse to modify an unreasonable non-compete 
agreement in Islam stemmed from the fact that the Nevada legislature had never 
taken a stance on the issue before that decision. In fact, prior to the Islam deci-
sion, Chapter 613 of the Nevada Revised Statutes only stated: 
The provisions of this section do not prohibit a person, association, company, cor-
poration, agent or officer from negotiating, executing and enforcing an agreement 
with an employee of the person, association, company or corporation which, upon 
termination of the employment, prohibits the employee from: 
                                                        
115  Id. 
116  Id. 
117  Id. 
118  Id. 
119  See id. 
120  Id. at 166. 
121  Id. 
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a. Pursuing a similar vocation in competition with or becoming employed 
by a competitor of the person, association, company or corporation; or 
b. Disclosing any trade secrets, business methods, lists of customers, secret 
formulas or processes or confidential information learned or obtained 
during the course of his or her employment with the person, association, 
company or corporation, if the agreement is supported by valuable con-
sideration and is otherwise reasonable in its scope and duration.122 
But the court’s strict refusal to modify in Islam did not sit well with the cur-
rent Nevada legislature.123 Thus, the Nevada legislature decided to change course 
and supersede the Islam decision by amending NRS 613 through AB 276. AB 
276 now explicitly requires courts to revise non-compete agreements and 
changes Nevada law so that it reads: 
5. If an employer brings an action to enforce a noncompetition covenant 
and the court finds the covenant is supported by valuable consideration 
but contains limitations as to time, geographical area or scope of activity 
to be restrained that are not reasonable, impose a greater restraint than 
is necessary for the protection of the employer for whose benefit the 
restraint is imposed and impose undue hardship on the employee, the 
court shall revise the covenant to the extent necessary and enforce the 
covenant as revised. Such revisions must cause the limitations contained 
in the covenant as to time, geographical area and scope of activity to be 
restrained to be reasonable and to impose a restraint that is not greater 
than is necessary for the protection of the employer for whose benefit 
the restraint is imposed.124 
 These combative changes raise the question: which policy generally offers 
the most beneficial effects for Nevada? 
IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE PUBLIC POLICY BEHIND NON-COMPETE 
AGREEMENTS 
The public policy rationales that supported Nevada’s initial refusal then ac-
ceptance to modify non-compete agreements are largely based on the court’s and 
legislature’s personal preference.125 This preference, however, has a command-
ing effect on Nevada’s most prominent industry: leisure and hospitality.126 The 
leisure and hospitality industry continues to be one of the state’s fastest growing 
                                                        
122  NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.200 (2017). 
123  Minutes of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Labor and Energy: Hearing on Assemb. 
B. 276 Before the S. Comm. on Com., Lab., & Energy, 2017 Leg., 79th Sess. 15 (Nev. May 
24, 2017) (statement of Misty Grimmer, Nev. Resort Ass’n) (“We are asking the Legislature 
to clarify in statute something that had been the practice of the courts for decades. However, 
a specific lawsuit came forth in which an entire noncompete agreement was thrown out be-
cause one portion of it was excessive.”). 
124  Assemb. B. 276, 2017 Leg., 79th Sess. (Nev. 2017) (emphasis added). 
125  See discussion supra Part IV. 
126  Nev. Resort Ass’n, Economic Impacts of the Hospitality Industry: Employment, 2015 NEV. 
GAMING FACT BOOK 1, 6 (2015), http://www.nevadaresorts.org/about/factbook/NRA-2015-
Factbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/8KBT-F3HH]. 
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employment sectors,127 currently employing roughly 337,000 employees, and ac-
counting for nearly 27.7 percent of Nevada’s workforce.128 Further, hotel-casinos 
make up twelve of the twenty largest employers in the state.129 And one of the 
major priorities in this industry is, and will always be, a stable customer base—
something that depends largely on customer relations and consistent contact with 
past customers.130 As a result, one of the major focuses for Nevada should be the 
state’s enforcement of non-compete agreements in the leisure and hospitality in-
dustry—a highly competitive, yet established field.131 Further, the public policy 
behind Nevada’s decision to reject or allow any modification of non-compete 
agreements must be supported by concrete evidence. Fortunately, one central 
public policy concern that can be measured based on empirical studies is whether 
employees are disproportionately harmed by non-compete agreements when 
compared to the benefit to employers. 
In a fairly recent study, Matt Marx and Lee Fleming examined the effect of 
non-compete agreements on employees.132 To do so, they analyzed the changes 
in Michigan’s non-compete policy in the 1980s.133 At that time, Michigan inad-
vertently overhauled its enforcement of non-compete agreements by eliminating 
antitrust laws that prevented the city from enforcing those agreements.134 Thus, 
by looking to the effects of the inadvertent reversal and its effect on individuals, 
firms, and regions, the study aimed to find whether non-compete agreements do 
in fact have a considerable, negative effect on the employee.135 
In its findings, the study concluded that non-compete agreements do have a 
considerable and detrimental effect on the employee in the following situations: 
when employers surprise an individual with a non-compete agreement at the 
signing of the employment contract when such an agreement was not discussed 
in initial employment negotiations; when employers use the non-compete agree-
ment to threaten employees with future litigation, deterring employees from ever 
violating the agreement even if the terms are blatantly unreasonable; and, when 
employers present the non-compete agreement as an ultimatum, thereby forcing 
                                                        
127  Id. 
128  Id. 
129  Id. 
130  Kye-Sung Chon & William P. Whelihan, Changing Guest Preferences and Marketing 
Challenges in the Resort Industry, 10 HOSPITALITY REV. 9, 12 (1992). 
131  See Kelvin King, The Value of Intellectual Property, Intangible Assets and Goodwill, 7 J. 
INTELL. PROP. RTS. 245, 245 (2002), (discussing the importance of “intangibles such as . . . 
customer lists”). 
132  Matt Marx & Lee Fleming, Non-compete Agreements: Barriers to Entry . . . and Exit?, 12 
INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 39, 39 (2012). Matt Marx is a professor at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology Sloan School of Management, and Lee Fleming is a professor at the 
Harvard Business School and Institute for Quantitative Social Science. Id. 
133  Id. at 41. 
134  Id. at 44. 
135  Id. 
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the employee to choose between accepting the agreement or losing the employ-
ment offer entirely.136 Specifically, the study discovered that: 
[T]he negative consequences of non-competes for individual careers are not inad-
vertent byproducts of a desire to protect trade secrets; rather, firms strategically 
manage the process of obtaining non-compete signatures. This suggests that firms 
are aware of these deleterious outcomes. [As stated in one survey] barely 3 in 10 
workers reported that they were told about the non-compete in their job offer. In 
nearly 70% of cases, the worker was asked to sign the non-compete after accept-
ing the offer—and, consequently, after having turned down (all) other offers. 
Nearly half the time, the non-compete was not presented to employees until or 
after the first day at work.137 
The study also found that the mobility of employees with specialized skills—
a group that is often subject to strict non-compete agreements—is disproportion-
ately affected by non-compete agreements.138 Notably, Marx and Fleming’s arti-
cle states “Michigan workers with highly specialized skills were twice as likely 
to remain loyal to their employers following the implementation of non-compete 
enforceability.”139 The study found that “[t]his result is likely due to the difficulty 
workers with specialized skills experience in finding work within their industry, 
as opportunities to use those skills are explicitly foreclosed by non-compete 
agreement.”140 
But this study also recognized that not every non-compete agreement should 
be treated equally.141 That is, the study focused on the negative effects of agree-
ments that employers thrust on employees with little to no prior discussion.142 
But when discussing those negative effects on employees that had a clear oppor-
tunity to negotiate the agreement—thereby mitigating the bargaining power of 
the employer—the study stated that those situations “ameliorate[] the aforemen-
tioned negative consequences for workers.”143 Essentially, an employer’s clear 
effort to draft a reasonable agreement—and to include the employee in that ef-
fort—balances the protection of an employer’s expense in training the employee 
and retaining competitive business practices with the limited mobility, freedom, 
and economical use of the employee’s skills. 
Like Marx and Fleming’s study, other professionals researching the eco-
nomic effects of non-compete agreements also agree that a fairly bargained for 
and clearly explained non-compete agreement might effectively balance the ben-
efits to an employer with the restrictions to an employee’s mobility.144 Moreover, 
                                                        
136  See id. at 49. 
137  Id. 
138  See id. at 48. 
139  Id. 
140  Id. 
141  Id. at 59. 
142  See id. at 49. 
143  Id. at 59. 
144  See Duarte Geraldino, What You Should Know About Noncompete Agreements, PBS 
NEWSHOUR (July 14, 2016, 6:11 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/making-sense/know-
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according to Russel Beck, an attorney who specializes in business and intellec-
tual property litigation, “over 50 percent of [employees] admit to taking infor-
mation when they leave.”145 And for an industry focused on larger, established 
businesses—such as Nevada’s, where casinos and hotels fuel the state’s highly 
competitive economy—non-compete agreements are more favorable because 
they protect employers’ legitimate business interests from debilitating dispersals 
to established competitors.146 
Additionally, in an industry where subtle price changes and unique business 
practices can spell the success or failure of large businesses, a non-compete 
agreement is instrumental in preserving even a slight competitive edge.147 And 
even though non-compete agreements pose disadvantages to a quickly growing 
entrepreneurial or small-business focused economy, that speedy growth and mo-
bility would not be a primary focus in an economy centered on large, established 
companies.148 Thus, an employer in an established industry—one that exercised 
all caution in trying to draft a reasonable non-compete agreement but narrowly 
missed the target—is essentially left helpless even to an employee who inten-
tionally steals information and uses his or her training and skills from the past-
employer to assist a clear competitor. Further, in that limited situation of reason-
able efforts toward negotiation and drafting,149 the clear benefit to a blameworthy 
employee’s mobility comes at a dramatically imbalanced harm to a competitive 
employer in an established industry. 
                                                        
non-compete-agreements/ [https://perma.cc/4GA9-7K9U] (interviewing attorney Russell 
Beck, who specializes in business and intellectual property litigation and has an influential 
blog on the subject, to discuss why businesses use non-competes). 
145  Id. 
146  See id. (stating that non-compete agreements are “used and seen as more favorable if the 
state is trying to encourage larger companies to thrive,” but explaining that the agreements 
may harm small, entrepreneurial environments). 
147  See Everett J. Prescott, Inc. v. Ross, 383 F. Supp. 2d 180, 190 (D. Me. 2005), amended by, 
390 F. Supp. 2d 44 (D. Me. 2005) (explaining how it is detrimental for an employer to lose an 
employee to a competitor if that employee knows how to “distinguish between [the em-
ployer’s] core and occasional customers, between those who negotiate for price and those who 
do not, [and] between the quick and slow pays.” Moreover, without any restriction on an em-
ployee’s future employment, the employee can presumably use this information to undercut 
the previous employer and affect the employer’s relationships with vendors or customers at 
large). 
148  See id.; see generally, OFFICE OF ECON. POL’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, NON-
COMPETE CONTRACTS: ECONOMIC EFFECTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 23, 26 (2016) (stating 
that “more stringent enforcement [of non-compete agreements] is negatively related to both 
employment growth and entrepreneurship,” but “[e]nhancing the transparency of non-com-
petes, better aligning them with legitimate social purposes like protection of trade secrets, and 
instituting minimal worker protections can all help to ensure that non-compete contracts con-
tribute to economic growth without unduly burdening workers.”). 
149  See OFFICE OF ECON. POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 148, at 13 (explain-
ing that only “10 percent of workers with non-competes report bargaining over [those agree-
ments].”). 
18 NEV. L.J. 261, KALKOWSKI- FINAL 12/15/17  4:56 PM 
Fall 2017] RECOGNIZING AN OVERCORRECTION 281 
Overall, studies such as the one by Marx and Fleming highlight the potential 
disadvantages of non-compete agreements that lack any clear negotiation be-
tween the employer and employee. But they also show that those few non-com-
pete agreements that involve considerable discussion between the employer and 
employee—including a focused effort to protect the employer’s interest in bal-
ance with the restriction to the employee—could reduce those disastrous effects. 
Accordingly, the remaining portions of this Note will present Nevada with nec-
essary changes to perfect its current law, AB 276. These changes recognize that 
the employer must not have the luxury of knowing that its non-compete agree-
ment will be revised if found unreasonable;150 but the employee must not have 
the ability to break from all unreasonable non-compete agreements. 
V. AN ARGUMENT FOR NEVADA TO AMEND ITS LEGISLATION ON REVISING 
NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS 
The central downfall of AB 276 is that it neglects the dissenting Justices’ 
argument in Islam that Nevada should only modify non-compete agreements in 
limited circumstances.151 AB 276 also dismisses numerous studies that illustrate 
the harms of an all-encompassing revision standard for unreasonable non-com-
pete agreements,152 and it removes the courts’ discretionary ability to refuse mod-
ification if the facts of a case do not warrant any leniency to the employer.153 But 
the legislature is not without recourse. Nevada can amend the language that AB 
276 added to NRS 613 so that it reads (the proposed changes being shown below 
as crossed out or italicized langauge): 
5. If an employer brings an action to enforce a noncompetition covenant 
and the court finds the covenant is supported by valuable consideration 
but contains limitations as to time, geographical area or scope of activity 
to be restrained that are not reasonable, impose a greater restraint than 
is necessary for the protection of the employer for whose benefit the 
restraint is imposed and impose undue hardship on the employee, the 
                                                        
150  Charles A. Sullivan, The Puzzling Persistence of Unenforceable Contract Terms, 70 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1127, 1151–52 (2009) (explaining that when an employer intentionally drafts an un-
reasonable non-compete agreement, knowing that it will be reformed by the courts, it has a 
dramatic effect on other employers, employees, “and, potentially, on the market.”). 
151  Golden Rd. Motor Inn, Inc. v. Islam, 376 P.3d 151, 162–63 (Nev. 2016) (Hardesty, J., 
dissenting) (“Reformation is an equitable remedy, and here, the equities run in favor of Atlan-
tis and against the employee who admittedly stole trade secret information from her employer 
to use in her new casino host job for a competitor.”). Essentially, the dissent argued that Ne-
vada should elect to modify non-compete agreements in a limited circumstance: where there 
is no evidence of bad faith on the part of the employer, and the facts of the case show that the 
equities run in favor of enforcing the agreement under reasonable terms. 
152  See Pivateau, supra note 7, at 689 (stating that a wide-open practice of blue-penciling 
“permits employers to overreach, and in so doing, harms employees.”). 
153  The language in AB 276 states that the courts “shall revise,” which courts interpret as a 
command; as opposed to the “may revise” language. Assemb. B. 276, 2017 Leg., 79th Sess. 
(Nev. 2017); 82 C.J.S. § 498 (2017) (“In a statute, ‘shall’ is a mandatory, directory term that 
does not afford discretion in fulfilling its command.”). 
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court shall may revise the covenant to the extent necessary and enforce 
the covenant as revised if the employer provides evidence that: 
a. It did not intentionally overreach in drafting the terms to the 
non-compete agreement; and 
b. It did not use its greater bargaining power to force the em-
ployee into accepting the restrictive terms of the non-compete 
agreement;  
6. If the court decides to revise a covenant, any revisions as to time, geo-
graphical area and scope of activity must cause the limitations con-
tained therein to be reasonable and to impose a restraint that is not 
greater than is necessary for the protection of the employer for whose 
benefit the restraint is imposed. 
This amendment to Nevada’s newly enacted legislation balances the legisla-
ture’s policy to protect employers with the judiciary’s policy to only revise non-
compete agreements when the equities of a case merit such action.154 
Looking to the text of this Note’s proposed amendment, the demand for ev-
idence of a fairly negotiated agreement in proposed Subsections 5(a) and (b) en-
sures that an employer is never rewarded for intentionally overreaching in the 
terms of the agreement. This recognizes the harmful effects on the employee 
when an employer knows an unreasonable agreement will always be reformed.155 
Further, the change in language from “shall revise” to “may revise” in Section 5 
allows courts to use their own discretion to modify an agreement—thereby fol-
lowing the appeal of the dissenting Justices in Islam that courts evaluate the facts 
of each case to determine whether it deserves the courts’ equitable power to re-
form.156 
 The proposed amendment is not enough by itself, however. While its lan-
guage tells courts what evidence to look for in each case, it does not provide any 
method for the courts to accomplish that task. Thus, the following discussion will 
outline two other states’ perfected methods for revising non-compete agree-
ments. The discussion will then explain how Nevada courts should adopt similar 
procedures. 
A. Nevada’s Employment Demographics Are Better Served by Limited 
Instances Where Courts Can Modify Non-Compete Agreements 
Several states have found success in modifying non-compete agreements by 
searching for evidence of “good faith” through a burden-shifting analysis where 
the parties must prove that the employer did or did not attempt to overreach and 
                                                        
154  See Michael J. Garrison & John T. Wendt, The Evolving Law of Employee Noncompete 
Agreements: Recent Trends and an Alternative Policy Approach, 45 AM. BUS. L.J., 107, 175–
76 (2008), for a detailed discussion on the harm of a standard that allows courts to reform all 
unreasonable non-compete agreements. In line with that discussion, the limited instances in 
this proposed amendment mitigate those harms by preventing any employer’s attempt to in-
tentionally overreach in drafting a non-compete agreement. 
155  Id. at 176. 
156  See discussion supra Section IV(a)(ii). 
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disadvantage the employee in drafting the agreement.157 That is, some courts es-
sentially request specific facts from the parties that show the employer drafted 
an agreement with the intent to include only fair, reasonable terms for their em-
ployee.158 If a court were to find this effort, it can then modify the agreement to 
make it reasonable by blue-penciling the agreement through either modification 
or striking of unreasonable terms.159 
 An example of a practical good-faith method comes from the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York’s decision in Estee Lauder 
Companies Inc. v. Batra.160 In Estee Lauder, Batra was the “Global General 
Brand Manager” responsible for overseeing all aspects of a branch of Estee 
Lauder.161 At the beginning of Batra’s employment, Batra signed an agreement 
that contained confidentiality, non-solicitation, and non-compete provisions.162 
The non-compete portion of the employment agreement stated: 
[D]uring your employment with the Company, and for a period of twelve (12) 
months after termination of you [sic] employment with the Company, regardless 
of the reason for the termination, you will not work for or otherwise actively par-
ticipate in any business on behalf of any Competitor in which you could benefit 
the Competitor’s business or harm the Company’s business by using or disclosing 
Confidential Information. This restriction shall apply only in the geographic areas 
for which you had work-related responsibility during the last twelve (12) months 
of your employment by the Company and in any other geographic area in which 
you could benefit the Competitor’s business through the use or disclosure of Con-
fidential Information.163 
The principal issues before the court were whether the terms of the non-
compete agreement were unreasonable, and, if the terms were unreasonable, 
whether the court could modify the terms under New York state law.164 
 At the time of the dispute, New York state law allowed a court to modify an 
unreasonable agreement if “the employer demonstrate[d] an absence of over-
reaching, coercive use of dominant bargaining power, or other anti-competitive 
misconduct, but has in good faith sought to protect a legitimate business interest, 
consistent with reasonable standards of fair dealing.”165 Specifically, New York 
law required the employer to show that the particular terms in the agreement 
guarded precisely the information needed, and only covered the actual ways that 
the employee could disseminate that information; an employer could not simply 
                                                        
157  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 184 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (reformation is 
permitted “if the party who seeks to enforce the term obtained it in good faith and in accord-
ance with reasonable standards of fair dealing.”). 
158  See id. 
159  See Pivateau, supra note 7, at 673. 
160  Estee Lauder Cos. Inc. v. Batra, 430 F. Supp. 2d 158 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
161  Id. at 161. 
162  Id. at 162. 
163  Id. 
164  Id. at 177. 
165  Id. at 180 (emphasis added). 
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create an expansive non-compete agreement that the employer would use to gen-
erally restrain the employee in the future.166 
In analyzing the non-compete agreement, the Estee Lauder court held that 
the agreement seemed to be reaching farther than necessary because the agree-
ment called for a global restraint on Batra’s future employment.167 However, 
when the court examined the potential harms to Estee Lauder that the agreement 
protected, it found that the geographical provision was closely tailored to the 
widespread, international reach of Estee Lauder’s competition.168 But the non-
compete agreement was unreasonable in its twelve-month temporal duration.169 
The district court stated three reasons for its conclusion that the temporal dura-
tion was unreasonable: (1) other agreements against Estee Lauder with the same 
twelve-month duration had previously been found unreasonable; (2) when other 
employees were in similar positions, courts reduced the non-compete agreement 
from six months to between four and five months; and (3) Estee Lauder offered 
Batra a reduction in the duration of the agreement from twelve months to four 
months after his employment ended.170 
Altogether, the district court faced an agreement that was both reasonable 
and unreasonable. This partial reasonability suggested that the agreement was in 
fact made in good faith, and was therefore eligible for modification.171 Conse-
quently, the court modified the agreement to last five months, not the original 
twelve months as previously contracted.172 
 Looking at the Estee Lauder decision as a whole, the District Court for the 
Southern District of New York provided the basic groundwork for any court to 
analyze a contract for both reasonability and good faith. Namely, the court’s in-
itial determination concerns what business interests the employer must protect, 
which provides a baseline for which interests the non-compete agreement should 
encompass. Then, if a court finds the non-compete agreement aligns with those 
specific interests, the remaining inquiry is whether any provisions of the contract 
are reasonable or whether any specific facts show that the employer otherwise 
exercised good faith in drafting the agreement.173 Once a court establishes good 
faith, it may then modify the agreement as necessary. 
The Estee Lauder decision also highlights a consistent procedure that allows 
a court to remain skeptical toward non-compete agreements while also respecting 
                                                        
166  Id. 
167  Id. at 180–81. 
168  Id. at 181. 
169  Id. (“[I]t is determined that the period of time set forth in the agreement and advanced here 
is greater than necessary to adequately protect Estee Lauder’s trade secrets and to protect the 
interests of Batra.”). 
170  Id. at 181. 
171  See id. at 180–82. 
172  Id. at 182. 
173  Id. at 180 (stating that partial enforcement may be justified if “the employer . . . has in 
good faith sought to protect a legitimate business interest. . . .”). 
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the parties’ intent to contract. Additionally, Estee Lauder is not the only case that 
demonstrates the good-faith requirement’s beneficial and simplistic approach to 
non-compete agreements. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in 
Reddy v. Community Health Foundation of Man also provided a detailed, struc-
tured opinion discussing the advantages of the good-faith analysis when an 
agreement does not contain certain reasonable provisions.174 
Reddy v. Community Health Foundation of Man dealt with a physician, Yasa 
J.M. Reddy, M.D., who came to the community of Man, West Virginia in 1977 
to practice medicine.175 In 1979, Reddy entered into several contracts with the 
Community Health Foundation of Man (the “Foundation”), a nonprofit corpora-
tion providing medical services in the city area.176 The case focused particularly 
on the fourth employment contract between Reddy and the Foundation, which 
stated: 
The physician covenants and agrees that he will not practice medicine within a 
radius of thirty (30) air miles of Man, West Virginia, for a period of three (3) 
years, after the termination of said agreement with the Foundation, which restric-
tive covenant shall be effective regardless of whether this agreement is terminated 
by action of either the Foundation or the physician or the expiration of the period 
provided for therein.177 
The contract posed several major issues, however, because of Reddy’s pre-
vious employment as a physician in Man before he agreed to work with the Foun-
dation.178 That is, Reddy was not an employee of the Foundation; he was a doctor 
retained to supplement its regular staff. Further, he worked as an emergency 
room doctor both before and during the period that the non-compete agreement 
remained in effect.179 Thus, the Supreme Court of West Virginia needed to de-
termine the legitimate interests at issue in the agreement, and lay out a procedure 
to evaluate the reasonableness, and thereby enforceability, of the non-compete 
agreement.180 
The Supreme Court of West Virginia in Reddy began its analysis by explain-
ing its highly skeptical approach toward non-compete agreements. The decision 
stated that courts should “approach restrictive covenants with grave reservations, 
and take a strict view of them on first impression.”181 The court evaluated the 
agreement at issue in Reddy with that skepticism by first looking to the terms of 
the agreement on their face.182 That is, the court initially looked for whether the 
agreement was excessively broad in regards to time or area, or if the agreement’s 
                                                        
174  Reddy v. Cmty. Health Found. of Man, 298 S.E.2d 906, 911 (W. Va. 1982). 
175  Id. at 908. 
176  Id. 
177  Id. at 909. 
178  Id. 
179  Id. 
180  Id. at 911. 
181  Id. at 915. 
182  Id. 
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true purpose appeared to merely harm the employee rather than serve the em-
ployer’s legitimate interests in protecting valuable information.183 And in this 
first step, the court expressed its lack of hesitation to strike the agreement as 
utterly void and unenforceable.184 But the court also expressed its leniency for 
agreements that ultimately survive this initial evaluation. The court explained 
that when an agreement is facially reasonable, the parties have demonstrated a 
sign of good faith.185 With that initial sign of good faith, moreover, the court 
could then proceed with additional analytical steps with the assumption that the 
employer has likely not attempted to over-reach at the employee’s disad-
vantage.186 
After evaluating the facial reasonableness step, the court in Reddy then ad-
dressed the issue of tailoring the agreement.187 The court found that judicial 
molding of the agreement was a remedy available to the parties in an attempt to 
find the “rule of best result.”188 With the rule of best result, the court could look 
to the non-compete agreement and narrow the terms so that it conformed to rea-
sonable requirements.189 Further, this analysis of the “best result” was largely a 
product of assigned burdens on the parties.190 That is, the analysis involved a 
balancing test where the court first turned to the employer, who held the burden 
to explain how each term in the agreement related to a legitimate protectable 
interest.191 Thereafter, the employee had his or her turn to show that either (1) 
the agreement covers interests that belong to the employee rather than the em-
ployer, or (2) that the agreement will unnecessarily overprotect the employee 
because the agreement favors the employer much more than it favors the em-
ployee.192 
Altogether, the Reddy decision outlined the three-step analysis that West 
Virginia courts follow with non-compete agreements: 
(1) The court must determine that the covenant is reasonable, and is being used 
reasonably by the employer. If not, the covenant is set aside. If the covenant is 
inherently reasonable the inquiry continues. (2) The employer must show, under 
the circumstances, what legitimate interests of his are implicated. When these are 
established, the reasonable covenant is presumptively enforceable in its entirety. 
(3) The employee is then given the chance to rebut the presumptive enforceability 
of the covenant by showing either that he has no company trade assets to abuse, 
                                                        
183  Id. 
184  Id. 
185  See id. at 915–16 (“If the reviewing court is satisfied that the covenant is reasonable on its 
face, hence within the perimeter of the rule of reason, it may then proceed with analysis leading 
to a ‘rule of best result.’ ”). 
186  Id. at 917. 
187  Id. at 916–17. 
188  Id. at 916. 
189  Id. 
190  Id. 
191  Id. 
192  Id. at 916–17. 
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or that the assets made available to him properly belong to him, or that the inter-
ests asserted by the employer may be protected by a partial enforcement of the 
covenant. If the employee prevails in this latter regard then the covenant may be 
tailored by the court to comport with the equities of the case.193 
In the end, however, the Reddy court did not tailor the terms of the agree-
ment.194 Instead, the court remanded the decision for further fact finding by the 
lower court.195 The Supreme Court of Appeals instructed the lower court to de-
termine whether enforcing the non-compete agreement was essential to the suc-
cessful operation of the Foundation as well as other businesses that provide med-
ical services.196 
B. A Practical Burden-Shifting Framework to Invoke Limited Instances of 
Modification 
The Estee Lauder and Reddy decisions demonstrate practical approaches 
that Nevada courts could adopt to decide when to pick up the blue-pencil under 
this Note’s proposed amendment to AB 276. And combining those approaches 
with the dissenting Justices’ argument in Islam provides a modern analysis di-
rectly tailored to the concerns of Nevada courts. Accordingly, Nevada should 
adopt the following two-step procedure to modify any future unreasonable non-
compete agreements that fall into the limited circumstances of this Note’s pro-
posed legislative amendment. 
In the first step, the employer has the initial burden to prove to the court that 
the disputed non-compete agreement possesses two qualities: (a) that the terms 
of the agreement are nearly reasonable on their face when compared to recent, 
prior cases in the same industry as the present matter;197 and (b) that the agree-
ment’s restrictions actually protect the employer’s important interests. Then, in 
a second step, the employer must prove that it proactively engaged in an open, 
balanced discussion on the terms of the non-compete agreement with the em-
ployee early on in negotiations.198 If the employer did carry that second-step bur-
den, the employee would then have a chance to rebut that evidence by offering 
additional evidence or directly disputing the employer’s offered evidence. 
                                                        
193  Id. at 917. 
194  Id. at 920. 
195  Id. 
196  Id. 
197  A court would determine whether the employer satisfied this prong by looking solely to 
the four-corners of the agreement in accord with the court’s practice in Reddy. Id. What a court 
would find as “nearly reasonable” would be at the discretion of the court in line with the court’s 
equitable power. 
198  This second step would align with the court’s practice in Estee Lauder, which requires the 
employer to show that the specific terms in the agreement guard precisely the information 
needed and only covered the actual ways that the employee could disseminate his or her unique 
skill or knowledge. See Estee Lauder Cos. Inc. v. Batra, 430 F. Supp. 2d 158, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006). 
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To explain this process in more detail, part (a) of the first step of the analysis 
would involve a comparison of the present terms of an agreement with past prec-
edent from both Nevada courts and similarly situated jurisdictions—a process 
that a court would have to go through to consider an agreement’s reasonableness 
in any case challenging a non-compete agreement. Similarly, part (b) of the first 
step would involve a court’s analysis of the business at issue and how the non-
compete agreement protects the interests of that business—again, a process that 
a court would have to go through to consider an agreement’s reasonableness in 
any case challenging a non-compete agreement. The second step would then re-
quire the employer to provide evidence of a clearly negotiated, equally bargained 
for agreement (e.g., periodic meetings with the employee; a clear discussion of 
the non-compete agreement’s terms with the employee; an explanation of the 
benefits that the employer will gain at the expense of the employee; an oppor-
tunity for the employee to object to any terms). Further, the employee would 
have the chance in this step to dispute that evidence through, for example, evi-
dence of: an employer’s insincere negotiations before the ultimate signature of 
the non-compete agreement; the lack of an opportunity to consult independent 
counsel; the absence of an opportunity to ask questions; any denial of the em-
ployee’s suggestions; or any attempt by the employer to force the employee to 
agree to the original terms without change. This highly skeptical and demanding 
step would ensure that the facts of each case eliminate any suggestion that the 
agreement was thrust on the employee or agreed to because of imbalanced posi-
tions—thereby extinguishing the potential harms to the public that are discussed 
in Marx and Fleming’s above-mentioned article.199 
These stages of scrutiny would also involve considerable discretion by the 
court to declare an agreement void or enforceable in accordance with the dis-
sent’s argument in Islam.200 That is, if the terms were far outside any reasonable 
limit in the first step, courts could immediately scrap the agreement and declare 
it void. Likewise, even if the agreement were close to reasonable, a court could 
exercise its discretion to pick up the blue pencil or not. The ultimate decision to 
protect the employer in each specific situation would lie with the court’s consid-
eration of the defendant’s culpability, the ultimate balance of hardships between 
the parties, the public interest in limiting the employee in an industry, and the 
need for the advancement of an entrepreneurial and innovation-friendly indus-
try.201 This discretionary-fueled action, paired with the burden-shifting schemes 
                                                        
199  See discussion supra Part V. 
200  Golden Road Motor Inn, Inc. v. Islam, 376 P.3d 151, 165 (Nev. 2016) (Hardesty, J., dis-
senting). 
201  The culpability of the defendant was a substantial reason that the dissent in Islam advocated 
for the court to modify the non-compete agreement in that particular case. See id. at 163 
(“Reformation is an equitable remedy, and here, the equities run in favor of Atlantis and 
against the employee who admittedly stole trade secret information from her employer to use 
in her new casino host job for a competitor.”). 
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discussed in Reddy, would then guide Nevada courts to consistently yet equitably 
resolve disputes over non-compete agreements.202 
C. The Benefits to Nevada’s Public Policy from the Proposed Statutory 
Amendment and Burden-Shifting Framework 
 If the Supreme Court of Nevada were to adopt the process outlined above,203 
the burden-shifting framework would serve the central public policy concerns of 
the Nevada judiciary expressed in Islam. For instance, one of the Nevada judici-
ary’s primary concerns from Islam in revising non-compete agreements was the 
potential increase of intentional overreach by employers; but this process satis-
fies that concern because each step incorporates the judiciary’s discretion to re-
fuse to revise based on the facts of the case—ensuring that no party can abso-
lutely predict the outcome.204 Similarly, the court’s decisions under this process 
allow a court to evaluate an agreement by following strict procedural require-
ments: a showing of facial reasonability based on provisions of an agreement; an 
initial burden on the employer to show the agreement covers only necessary in-
terests; and a final burden on the employee to show that the agreement runs 
against the equities and in favor of unenforceability.205 Therefore, this burden-
shifting framework will almost certainly smoke out any intentional overreach by 
an employer because every stage of the framework charges the employer will 
proving such overreach didn’t exist, meaning it has to overcome a presumption 
of overreach. 
These procedural requirements, mixed with the discretionary actions of the 
judiciary, would also have the added effect of addressing the Nevada judiciary’s 
concerns of judicial resources because it would utilize the time, effort, and re-
search already spent litigating the reasonableness of an agreement. That is, the 
court would craft a final, reasonable agreement based on the hours already spent 
defining what reasonable terms are in the first stage of analysis. That use of al-
ready expended resources, paired with the fact that only roughly 10 percent of 
employees with non-compete agreements report bargaining for the agreement,206 
suggests that the potential influx of cases that may require the judiciary to go 
through the full process of modification would likely be insubstantial—espe-
cially since most cases would be dismissed at the first stage of the burden-shift-
ing framework based on clear overreach by the employer. 
                                                        
202  See Reddy v. Cmty. Health Found. of Man, 298 S.E.2d 906, 916–17 (W. Va. 1982). 
203  See discussion supra Sections V(a)–(b). 
204  See Garrison & Wendt, supra note 154, at 130–31 (“The policy concern about overreaching 
by employers is resolved by refusing to permit reformation where employers have deliberately 
drafted unreasonable provisions.”). 
205  See Viva R. Moffat, Making Non-Competes Unenforceable, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 939, 949 n.43 
(2012) (explaining how the Reddy decision highlights how a quick-look analysis of facial rea-
sonability provides a manageable in-or-out procedure for modifiable non-compete agree-
ments). 
206  OFFICE OF ECON. POL’Y U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 148, at 13. 
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In sum, an employer would simply have no clear answer whether its agree-
ment would be modified if found unreasonable under the proposed burden-shift-
ing analysis.207 Although the process may be somewhat inconsistent based on its 
case-by-case analysis, it is this case-by-case analysis that is the essence of an 
equitable remedy—to bring the fairest result in a specific situation as opposed to 
a rigid, technical process.208 Even further, this burden-shifting procedure would 
not trample the parties’ intent to form the non-compete agreement because it 
would allow a court to fashion the best possible terms of the agreement—terms 
that cleanly align with the employer’s expectations, the employee’s rights, and 
public interest.209 
CONCLUSION 
The legislature’s recent passing of AB 276 is a move toward the protection 
of Nevada’s competitive industries. But this movement should have been a step, 
not a leap. Nevada should not have forced courts to revise every unreasonable 
non-compete agreement. Rather, Nevada should have enacted an amendment 
that allowed courts to modify unreasonable non-compete agreements in only lim-
ited circumstances: where the non-compete agreement was the product of a fair, 
even-powered negotiation between the employer and their employee. Courts 
could then interpret that amendment through a burden-shifting analysis, where 
courts place the burden on the employer to prove that the negotiations surround-
ing the agreement were fair and evenly bargained. This process would retain the 
vital role of skepticism toward the employer, while also safeguarding confiden-
tial practices, expenses, and resources that are pivotal to the development of Ne-
vada’s central industries. 
                                                        
207  See supra discussion Part VI (“Likewise, even if the agreement were close to reasonable, 
a court could exercise its discretion to pick up the blue pencil or not.”). 
208  See Doug Rendleman, The Trial Judge’s Equitable Discretion Following Ebay v. Mer-
cexchange, 27 REV. LITIGATION 63, 73 (2007) (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. 
of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) (“Once a [plaintiff’s] right and a [defendant’s] violation have 
been shown, the scope of a district court’s equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, 
for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.”)). 
209  See Cent. Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Ingram, 678 S.W.2d 28, 37 (Tenn. 1984). 
